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[In Bosnia] we thought that democracy was the 
highest priority, and we measured it by the num-
ber of elections we could organize…In hindsight, 
we should have put the establishment of the rule 
of law first, for everything else depends on it: a 
functioning economy, a free and fair political sys-
tem, the development of civil society, [and] public 
confidence in police and the courts.
Lord Paddy Ashdown, UN High Representative in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, October 2002
Since its inception, the United Nations has worked to support international peace and secu-rity through various means, particularly through 
the use of UN peacekeeping forces. However, many 
have questioned whether UN interventions have em-
pirically helped end conflict and maintain peace in the 
aftermath of a conflict. This paper will examine the 
impact that UN actions, specifically peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding measures, have on the security and the 
socio-political conditions in post-conflict states.
There is extensive quantitative academic litera-
ture on the relationship between peacekeeping and the 
durability of peace in post-conflict settings, finding 
overall that UN involvement is significantly correlated 
with an increased durability of peace in post-conflict 
settings. One way in which a peacekeeping operation 
can affect the durability of peace is by altering the in-
centives that determine whether parties choose to go 
to war. Another way the operation could affect the du-
rability of peace is by reducing uncertainty and fear be-
tween factions.1 Peacekeeping missions can also take 
on peacebuilding roles beyond military tasks such as 
improving governance and the rule of law, monitoring 
elections, reforming police forces and the judiciary, 
human rights monitoring and training, and rebuild-
ing state institutions. Peacekeeping missions (particu-
larly multidimensional operations) can then sustain 
post-conflict peace by preventing the political abuses 
that originally instigated the conflict.2 Overall, the 
academic literature posits that peacekeeping can help 
the durability of peace by both alleviating mistrust be-
tween formerly warring parties and by strengthening 
domestic political institutions to prevent misuses of 
power that provoke war. By strengthening them and 
improving their legitimacy, UN peacekeeping bolsters 
both the rule of law and the capacity of political in-
stitutions to respond to problems that could provoke 
conflict. 
There is very little academic literature, however, 
on the specific question this paper wishes to address: 
how does peacekeeping influence the rule of law in 
post-conflict settings? Some policy-oriented work ex-
ists on the topic, which mostly takes an overwhelm-
ingly negative outlook on the ability of the UN to im-
ABSTRACT
The United Nations frequently engages in peacekeeping activities in post-conflict so-
cieties in order to build and sustain peace. A crucial component of the durability 
of peace is the rule of law. While there is extensive empirical literature on the effect of 
UN peacekeeping on the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting, there is little lit-
erature that empirically examines whether UN peacekeeping can improve the rule of 
law in a post-conflict state. This study uses data to determine whether UN peacekeep-
ing has a positive effect on the quality of rule of law in post-conflict settings. Using re-
gression and matching analysis, this study does not find evidence that peacekeeping 
influences the rule of law in a post-conflict setting in either a positive or negative direc-
tion. Even so, the "non-findings" of this study have implications for policy makers who 
wish to have post-conflict peace building efforts in order to improve the rule of law. 
sweta maturu, emory university (2013)
the united nations peacekeeping and rule of law 
reform in post-conflict societies
66
columbia university journal of politics & society
prove the rule of law. The UN approaches post-conflict 
policing and reforming the rule of law on an ad-hoc 
basis due to resource constraints and lack of a clear 
vision on how the mission should approach policing 
in a post-conflict setting.3 Additionally, while certain 
rule of law tasks by the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations may be necessary, the im-
plementation of these tasks is very dependent on the 
characteristics of a mission’s operating environment, 
which the mission cannot control. Missions often have 
resources, but only enough to provide short-term se-
curity and stability. Because of these constraints, UN 
peacekeeping cannot consistently improve key rule of 
law institutions in post-conflict settings.4 Finally, this 
literature finds that rule of law efforts have fallen short 
because they tend to focus heavily on building legal 
institutions that are part of the formal sector. This ap-
proach can be futile, as the institutions are useless if 
the people do not believe in their value, efficacy, and 
ability to resolve disputes.5
There is a clear divide in the academic and policy 
literature. While academic literature finds that peace-
keeping has a positive effect on the durability of peace 
(which includes the rule of law), policy and qualita-
tively oriented literature overall finds that peacekeep-
ing has an unclear effect on the quality of rule of law 
in post-conflict settings. This paper hopes to fill the 
gap in the academic literature by providing a quantita-
tive large-N analysis of the relationship between UN 
peacekeeping and the long-term rule of law in post-
conflict societies. This paper will explore the following 
question: in a conflict and post-conflict setting, does, 
UN peacekeeping effectively improve the rule of law 
years after a conflict has ended? To limit the very large 
scope of this question, I focus on the quality of rule of 
law in the long-term. I want to compare the UN’s ef-
fectiveness in improving the quality of a host country’s 
main rule of law institutions. Does the presence of UN 
peacekeeping troops, UN police, and/or UN formed 
police units improve both the effectiveness of the po-
lice, justice, and corrections sectors and the quality of 
rule of law in a post-conflict society?
DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS
Rule of Law
What exactly is the rule of law? Academics and 
policy-makers have historically struggled to accurately 
define this term, as it encompasses several issues and 
can be applied to different situations. In his 2004 re-
port, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Con-
flict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Secretary Gen-
eral Kofi Annan defines the rule of law as, “a principle 
of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, 
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and 
which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures 
to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy 
of law, equality before the law, accountability to the 
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation 
of powers, participation in decision-making, legal cer-
tainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and 
legal transparency.” 
In addition, Thomas Carothers (1998) defines 
the rule of law as “a system in which the laws are pub-
lic knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally 
to everyone.” Specifically, the rule of law involves the 
following “anyone accused of a crime has the right to 
a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent un-
til proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal 
system, including courts, prosecutors, and police, are 
reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are 
impartial and independent, not subject to political 
influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important, 
the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal 
framework, its officials accept that the law will be ap-
plied to their own conduct, and the government seeks 
to be law-abiding.”6
These two definitions encompass the manner in 
which the term “rule of law” will be used in this paper. 
The rule of law is a system in which people are held ac-
countable to the law equitably and independently, and 
requires the effective functioning of legal institutions 
including the judicial, police, and corrections sectors 
of a society.
Peacekeeping
Not all UN peacekeeping missions are the same. 
Borrowing from the conceptual definitions of Doyle 
and Sambanis (2000) and Fortna (2004), we can di-
vide UN peacekeeping missions into different categories.
A monitoring or observer mission is an “interim 
arrangement used in violent conflicts with the consent 
of the host government. In these conflicts, there is no 
formal determination of aggression. The purpose is to 
monitor a truce and help negotiate a peace through 
the presence of military and civilian observers.”7 
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These missions are not armed; their main task is to 
simply watch and report what they observe.
A traditional peacekeeping mission involves de-
ploying military units and civilian expert officials to 
facilitate the negotiated settlement of a conflict. It is 
usually authorized with a Chapter VI mandate under 
the UN Charter, meaning it is deployed with the con-
sent of the parties involved. This type of peacekeep-
ing mission is meant to monitor compliance with an 
agreement, but they can also “establish and police a 
buffer zone and assist the demobilization and disar-
mament of military forces.”8 
A multidimensional peacekeeping mission is 
also based on consent, but is designed to implement 
a more comprehensive peace agreement. It includes “a 
mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, rang-
ing from those of traditional peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs) to more multidimensional strategies for ca-
pacity expansion (e.g., economic reconstruction) and 
institutional transformation (e.g., reform of the police, 
army, and judicial system; elections; civil society re-
building).”9 Rule of law reform activities are therefore 
a part of multidimensional peacekeeping missions.
Peace enforcement missions involve military in-
tervention and operate under a Chapter VII mandate. 
Peacekeeping missions that operate under a Chapter 
VII mandate are sent into volatile conflict settings 
where the state is either unable or unwilling to main-
tain security and order. Chapter VII mandated mis-
sions involve traditional peacekeeping tasks but also 
include more complex tasks that may require the use 
of active, coercive force.10
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One important factor that influences the dura-
bility of peace is the form of justice that emerges in a 
post-conflict society. Post-conflict justice, as discussed 
in this paper, is separate from peacekeeping activities. 
Although it may be a complement to peacekeeping 
activities, it is distinct from peacekeeping itself. As it 
influences the ability of the UN to reform the rule of 
law, post-conflict justice must be discussed in the con-
text of the rule of law and UN peacekeeping activities.
Non-retributive post-conflict justice focuses 
on the victims and the human rights violations they 
faced during a conflict. Usually, this takes the form 
of reparations to victims and truth commissions. A 
non-retributive justice mechanism leaves many per-
petrators of conflict free on the streets. This presence 
of perpetrators, and their potential to commit further 
violence, could influence the ability of the UN and 
national security forces to effectively re-establish the 
rule of law, because it is an additional security risk 
UN forces must address. The literature is divided on 
the impact of retributive versus non-retributive post-
conflict justice on the durability of peace. Retributive 
post-conflict justice focuses on holding perpetrators 
accountable for the crimes they committed during 
the conflict. Institutional mechanisms that pursue re-
tributive justice include prosecution and sentencing 
in domestic courts and/or special tribunals, interna-
tional tribunals, and joint international and domestic 
tribunals created to address crimes committed during 
the conflict.11 In democratic settings, these measures 
are usually a part of a greater reconciliation process 
designed to support human rights in a post-conflict 
setting. In an autocratic setting, however, retributive 
justice is arbitrary and aims to hurt the losing side of 
the conflict. In this case, trials are often “show trials” 
where the outcome is predetermined.12
Post-conflict justice could also protect against 
a cycle of revenge attacks. If victims of war feel that 
crimes and wrongdoings are inadequately addressed, 
they may be tempted to conduct “private justice” as 
a substitute for insufficient legal justice. Private jus-
tice could take on the form of extra-legal killings, 
fragmenting a peace between forces in a post-conflict 
state and increasing the risk of civil war recurrence. 
The immunity of insurgents increases the risk of “wild 
justice,” which is the unpredictable revenge of one 
side to obtain justice that could inadvertently provoke 
conflict again. Consequently, by holding criminals ac-
countable, retributive post-conflict justice may help a 
post-conflict government make sure that individuals 
do not seek revenge through private (and often vio-
lent) means.13 On the other hand, some argue that 
retributive post-conflict justice can have a negative 
effect on peace. Post-conflict justice, particularly re-
tributive post-conflict justice, could provoke resent-
ment among the losing side by opening old wounds 
and creating new ones in already fractious societies.14
Retributive justice is easier to carry out when 
the military outcome of the conflict is clear. Prosecut-
ing war criminals is more feasible when insurgents or 
the former regime is clearly and severely defeated and 
no longer poses a threat to the present leadership. In 
situations where there is no clear victory or where the 
perpetrators are hard to identify, non-retributive post-
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conflict justice may be a better option.
Amnesty measures are mechanisms that make 
perpetrators immune from post-conflict prosecution. 
Amnesty is meant to convince parties to put down 
arms in exchange for a guarantee of not being pros-
ecuted.15 However, amnesty measures could limit 
the actual realization of justice and reduce the period 
of post-conflict peace, as they may help perpetrators 
avoid prosecution and create instability again. Addi-
tionally, amnesty measures increase the risk of private 
revenge and distort the process of peaceful reconcili-
ation. Combined with the fact that post-conflict so-
cieties often lack the resources to carry out fair and 
impartial trials without harming other aspects of 
peacebuilding, this makes the value of amnesty uncer-
tain.16 Thus, it is important to look at various forms 
of post-conflict justice because it could impact the 
way in which UN peacekeeping should affect the rule 
of law in a post-conflict setting. 
Theory & Hypotheses
The UN may be able to improve the rule of law 
by improving the efficacy of institutions that carry 
out rule of law functions, and bolstering public con-
fidence in the police and judicial institutions. The UN 
facilitates the reformation of rule of law in post-con-
flict countries by specifically working to improve each 
aspect of rule of law in a country: the police sector, 
justice institutions, and corrections facilities. By train-
ing local police and improving the quality of judicial 
institutions through training and programming, the 
UN not only improves institutional capacity to settle 
disputes, but also works to build trust in legal insti-
tutions. UN peacekeeping can alleviate fear and mis-
trust towards rule of law institutions, which is a legacy 
of many conflicts, by strengthening the capacity of 
those rule of law institutions to address wrongdoings. 
By alleviating this mistrust of rule of law institutions, 
the UN hopes people will use rule of law institutions, 
further increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the institutions. The UN then perpetuates a cycle of 
trust, legitimacy, and effectiveness in rule of law insti-
tutions in post-conflict societies. Therefore:
Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping 
personnel in a post-conflict country will strength-
en the quality of the country’s rule of law institu-
tions.
Not all UN missions are the same, however. Given the 
various types of peacekeeping missions, some will be 
better at strengthening the rule of law in a post-con-
flict setting, given the type of mandate and capacity 
they have. For instance, a simple monitoring mission, 
whose purview solely involves observing a truce and/
or cease-fire, will not be as effective in reforming and/
or developing rule of law institutions as a multidimen-
sional peacekeeping mission, which has the capacity 
and strength of mandate to carry out rule of law re-
form tasks. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of 
UN mission mandate will increase its ability to 
strengthen the quality of a country’s rule of law 
institutions.
Monica Toft, in her book Securing the Peace: 
The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars, finds that a ne-
gotiated settlement tends to reduce the likelihood of 
the durability of peace unless there is comprehensive 
security sector reform that is aimed at restructuring 
rule of law institutions.17 Thus, if a peace agreement 
does not include provisions for security sector reform 
a UN peacekeeping mission will most likely not have 
the mandate to carry out rule of law reform (a compo-
nent of security sector reform). Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does 
not include provisions for security sector reform 
will lower the probability that a UN peacekeep-
ing mission can successfully strengthen the rule 
of law.
Post-conflict justice, depending on the type, 
can also influence the UN’s ability to successfully re-
form the rule of law. Particularly, amnesty measures 
may help perpetrators avoid prosecution and conse-
quently remain politically intact to instigate conflict. 
Additionally, amnesty measures both increase the risk 
of private revenge and distort the process of peaceful 
reconciliation. Thus:
Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures 
will weaken UN peacekeeping’s ability to improve 
rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.
Control Factors
There are several factors that influence the UN’s 
ability to implement rule of law reform in a post-con-
flict setting. Notably, the severity and degree of hostil-
ity of the conflict could determine the success of the 
UN in improving the rule of law. In a post-conflict en-
vironment where deep hostility, ethnic fractionaliza-
tion, and high levels of casualties exist, it may be more 
difficult for UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of 
law. These hostile conditions can be reinforced by the 
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duration of conflict as well. Longer fighting implies 
higher fatalities in conflict and ultimately deeper hos-
tility. The more hostile the conflict (as indicated by the 
number of fatalities, level of ethnic fractionalization, 
and duration of conflict), the more difficult it will be 
for UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law in the 
post-conflict environment. Additionally, the level of 
economic development can influence the level of po-
litical stability and security in a post-conflict setting. 
The more stable and developed a post-conflict setting 
is, the more feasible it is for the UN to implement rule 
of law reforms, as they do not have to deal with exter-
nal security risks relating to economic concerns. Thus, 
the regression between UN peacekeeping and the rule 
of law controls for the number of deaths in conflict, 
war duration, ethnic fractionalization, and economic 
development (through proxies of electricity consump-
tion per capita and real GDP per capita).
RESEARCH DESIGN
Unit of Analysis
For the empirical analysis, I use the International 
Peacebuilding Data Set from Michael Doyle and Nich-
olas Sambanis. The original data set is cross-sectional 
and includes 124 events of civil wars. It includes “wars 
that started since 1944 and terminated before 1997 
and wars which were ongoing as of December 1999, 
but which had at least one significant settlement or 
truce or third-party peace operation, signaling the 
parties’ desire to terminate the war and start a peace-
building process.”18 This allows for the examination 
of peacebuilding outcomes at least two years after the 
end of the war or after the start of a peace operation. 
Doyle and Sambanis also classify the data into four 
categories of peacekeeping missions: monitoring or 
observing missions, traditional peacekeeping, multi-
dimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. 
This classification is used to examine the relationship 
between the scope of a mission and its ability to im-
prove rule of law institutions in a post-conflict state.
To measure the dependent variable, rule of law, 
I use the Rule of Law estimate from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators. “Rule of Law,” as measured by 
the World Bank Governance Indicators, encompasses 
several indicators that “measure the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society.” These include perceptions of the incidence of 
crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judi-
ciary, and the enforceability of contracts. These indi-
cators measure the protection of property rights and 
the success of a society in developing an environment 
in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for 
economic and social interactions.
The World Bank’s estimates of the quality of rule 
of law are normally distributed with a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one each year of measure-
ment. This implies that virtually all scores lie between 
–2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores correspond to better out-
comes/higher qualities of rule of law. This data spans 
from 1996 to 2012. Given this data limitation, for my 
first set of regressions, I only used those civil wars that 
ended 1986 or later in the Doyle and Sambanis data 
set, providing me with sixty-six events of civil war. I 
then coded the Rule of Law score ten years after a civil 
war ended. I also coded the Rule of Law scores eleven 
years after the conflict ended. I then coded and cal-
culated a new dependent variable, the change in Rule 
of Law score by subtracting the Rule of Law score for 
ten years after the conflict from the score for ten years 
after the conflict.
The reason for my decision to evaluate the Rule 
of Law score between the tenth and eleventh years is 
three-fold. First, this study is designed to measure the 
effect of UN peacekeeping measures on the long-term 
rule of law, rather than the short term. As a result, a 
sizeable gap of ten years between the end of a conflict 
and the measurement of the Rule of Law ensures that 
the long-term, rather than the short-term, rule of law 
is the subject of this analysis. Second, a ten-year gap 
enables this study to use a greater set of post-conflict 
states in its analysis, given the limitations of both the 
World Bank and the Doyle and Sambanis data set, as 
described above. Lastly, ten years is not so long a pe-
riod of time that one would expect for the impact of 
a peacekeeping operation to have faded regardless of 
the results on the long-term rule of law. This technique 
of measuring years out after the conflict has ended is 
not unique. Fortna, in a quantitative study on peace-
keeping and democratization, follows a similar tech-
nique in which she measures her dependent variable 
of democratization one, two, and five years after the 
end of a conflict in order to measure movement from 
autocracy to democracy.19
I ultimately decided to use this difference in 
scores as the measure of improvement of each coun-
try’s rule of law, as it would give me a sense if each 
country’s rule of law improves. If I were to just look 
at only the level of rule of law ten years after a conflict 
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Table 1: Variables in Analysis 
Independent Variables Controls Dependent Variable 
un2int: Was there a UN peace operation? 
0 = no; 1 = yes (Doyle & Sambanis 2000). 
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost): The 
log of the total number of dead, including 
civilians and battle deaths (Doyle & Sambanis 
2000). 
World Bank Rule of Law score 10 
years after a conflict ended 
(wbgi.rle 10 years after): World 
Bank Governance Indicator Rule of 
Law score 10 years after a civil war 
has ended (World Bank Governance 
Indicators). 
untype 2: UN peace operation involving 
deployment of neutral military and/or 
civilian observers (Doyle & Sambanis 
2000). 
Real GDP per capita (rgdpcaps): Real GDP 
per capita in US$ (Doyle & Sambanis 2000). 
Difference between World Bank 
Rule of Law scores 10 and 11 
years after a conflict has ended 
(difference.wbgi.rle): Change in 
Rule of Law score; the difference 
between the ROL score 11 years 
after the conflict and 10 years after 
the conflict (calculated from World 
Bank Governance Indicators). 
untype 3: UN peace operation involving 
traditional peacekeeping operation 
(military and civilian personnel) (Doyle & 
Sambanis 2000) 
Development levels (develop): measured by a 
proxy of electricity consumption per capita 
(Doyle & Sambanis 2000) 
Difference in CIM values 10 and 
11 years after a conflict has ended 
(difference.cim): the change in 
Contract-Intensive Money 10 years 
and 11 years after a conflict has 
ended. CIM is the ratio of non-
currency money to total money 
supply (IMF International Financial 
Statistics) 
untype 4: UN multidimensional 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation 
(Doyle & Sambanis 2000) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (elf): 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index; The 
index ranges from 0-100 and higher values 
correspond to higher degrees of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization in the country (Doyle & 
Sambanis 2000). 
 
untype 5: Peace enforcement, either 
multilateral through the United Nations or 
by a third party or coalition of parties, 
acting under a multilateral, UN-sanctioned 
mandate. Also includes executive authority 
and supervising authority (Doyle & 
Sambanis 2000). 
War duration (wardur): Duration of the war 
measured in months (Doyle & Sambanis 2000). 
 
 Presence of a treaty signed to end a conflict 
(treaty): coded 1 = treaty signed by the parties 
with intent to end the war; 0 = no major treaty 
was signed (although cease-fires were possibly 
agreed upon at various times) (Doyle & 
Sambanis 2000). 
 
 Presence of amnesty measures (pcj.amnesty): 
Records whether or not an amnesty was given 
in the post-conflict peace period. Coded 0 - No 
Amnesty: There were no amnesties after the 
conflict; Coded 1 - Amnesty: At least one 
amnesty was initiated after the conflict 
(Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster 2012). 
 
 Presence of Security Sector Reform (SSRI): 
Security sector reform; a dummy variable that is 
a combination of 2 factors: 1) whether or not 
the combatants will form a new army after the 
war based on quotas from each side and 2) 
indicates the extent to which a settlement is 
implemented. The combination SSRI variable 
only includes those cases in which a 
successfully implemented settlement was 
present. If the settlement was well-executed, the 
variable was coded “1.” Unsuccessful 
implementations were “0" (Toft 2010). 
 

Table 1: Variables in Analysis
71
the united nations peacekeeping and rule of law reform in post-conflict societies
has ended, there would be no way to control for base-
line (pre-existing levels of rule of law). It would not 
be possible to know if the treatment (peacekeeping or 
no peacekeeping) actually improves the rule of law. By 
looking at the change in rule of law, I can directly ob-
serve if there is any improvement from peacekeeping. 
Looking ten years after a conflict has ended, and cal-
culating this difference helps reduce endogeneity con-
cerns  and reverse causality concerns that arise from 
the fact that peacekeepers go to the places where the 
rule of law is weakest initially. 
Another variable I use to measure the rule of law 
(as a proxy) is Contract Intensive Money. Contract 
Intensive Money (CIM) is the ratio of non-currency 
money to total money supply, or (M2-C)/M2, where 
M2 is a broad definition of the money supply and C 
is currency held outside banks. I calculate CIM in this 
analysis using the International Monetary Fund’s In-
ternational Financial Statistics data on currency out-
side of banks, money supply, and quasi-money sup-
ply.20 CIM is supposed to act as a proxy for the rule 
of law because if contract enforcement and property 
rights are strong, actors will be more willing to hold 
money in a form other than currency. This is because 
the value of non-currency money depends on the 
ability of depositors to enforce claims against banks 
and the ability of banks to enforce claims against bor-
rowers. Therefore, a higher CIM (the higher amount 
of non-currency money that people hold) suggests a 
better quality of legal institutions. Essentially, a higher 
CIM value correlates with stronger rule of law.21
Similarly to my calculations for the World Bank 
rule of law variable, I calculate the difference between 
the CIM value a country has ten years after the con-
flict and eleven years after the conflict. This is done to 
isolate the measure of the improvement in rule of law, 
rather than the level of rule of law itself. As the data on 
CIM spans a longer time frame, I am able to use 119 
cases from the original Doyle and Sambanis data set 
for a second round of regressions with this dependent 
variable.
 The data for the controls come from a vari-
ety of sources. The controls of deaths from conflict, 
real GDP per capita, development, ethnic fractional-
ization, and the presence of a treaty signed all come 
from the data set constructed by Doyle and Sambanis. 
The data for the amnesty measures come from Bin-
ningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster and the data for se-
curity sector reform comes from Toft. These data sets 
do not match up with Doyle and Sambanis. Thus I had 
to merge these data sets by matching each conflict in 
Doyle and Sambanis data set to their corresponding 
data in the post-conflict justice and the SSR data sets. 
Table 1 lists the independent variables, controls, 
and dependent variables that are used in the analysis.
Regression Models
To first test my hypotheses, I conducted several 
ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the re-
lationship between UN peacekeeping and the quality 
of rule of law, while controlling for factors that detail 
the hostility of conflict, presence of security sector re-
form, and the presence of amnesty measures as post-
conflict justice mechanisms. I run two major sets of 
regressions, each using a different dependent variable. 
The first set uses the rule of law measure from the 
World Bank, and the second uses the Contract Inten-
sive Money variable as a proxy for the quality of rule 
of law. 
I first test the hypotheses by carrying out a va-
riety of regressions with the dependent variable as 
the difference in rule of law/CIM scores ten years and 
eleven years after a conflict has ended. In order to test 
all facets of hypotheses 1 and 2 on the independent 
variable of peacekeeping, I create five models with dif-
ferent variations of the general independent variable 
“UN peacekeeping” to test on the dependent variable. 
By testing each mandate type by itself, I can examine 
if different mandate types have varying influences on 
the quality of rule of law (what Hypothesis 2 is ques-
tioning). Below is a table that describes the indepen-
dent variable(s) that each model contains.
Model Independent Variables/Mission 
type 
Model A All mandate types (untype 2, 3, 4, 
5) 
Model B Presence of UN peacekeeping 
(un2int) 
Model C Monitoring/observer mission 
(untype 2) 
Model D Traditional peacekeeping mission 
(untype 3) 
Model E Multidimensional peacekeeping 
mission (untype 4) 
Model F Peace enforcement mission 
(untype 5) 

Table 2: Independent Variable Models22
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Additionally, I also interact the amnesty mea-
sures and security sector reform variables with the 
UN peacekeeping presence variable (un2int) to fur-
ther test Hypotheses 3 and 4. I wish to test if the ef-
fectiveness of peacekeeping will vary depending on 
what values the amnesty and security sector reform 
variables take. The interactive terms are the products 
of the basic peacekeeping variable (un2int) and the 
SSRI and amnesty variables.
I. Regressions with the World Bank measure as 
dependent variable
This set of tests has N = 66. Due to data miss-
ing in the post-conflict justice amnesty variable and 
the security sector reform variable, I ran three differ-
ent sets of tests. The first set of tests includes all the 
independent variables and controls listed in Table 1 
excluding the Security Sector Reform variable (Table 
3: PCJ Amnesty, included in Appendix B). The second 
set of tests includes all independent variables and con-
trols listed in Table 1, excluding the amnesty dummy 
variable (Table 4: SSRI, included in Appendix B). The 
third set of tests includes all independent variables 
and controls listed in Table 1, but excludes both the 
amnesty and security sector reform variables (Table 5: 
Neither, included in Appendix B). The results in Tables 
3, 4, and 5 are the coefficient estimates of the controls/
independent variables on the dependent variable.
II. Regressions with CIM measure as dependent 
variable
This set of tests has an N = 119. Due to data miss-
ing in the post-conflict justice amnesty variable and 
the security sector reform variable, I ran four different 
sets of tests with the CIM measure as the dependent 
variable. The first set of tests includes all the indepen-
dent variables and controls listed in Table 1, includ-
ing both the Security Sector Reform and PCJ amnesty 
variable (Table 6: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at 
the same time), included in Appendix C). The sec-
ond set of tests includes all independent variables and 
controls listed in Table 1, including the amnesty vari-
able and excluding the SSRI dummy variable (Table 7: 
Controls + Amnesty control (No SSRI), included in 
Appendix C). The third set of tests includes all inde-
pendent variables and controls listed in Table 1, in ad-
dition to the SSRI variable, and excludes the amnesty 
variables (Table 8: Controls + SSRI control (No Am-
nesty), included in Appendix C). The fourth set of tests 
includes all independent variables and controls listed 
in Table 1, but excludes both the amnesty and SSRI 
variables (Table 9: Controls sans Amnesty and SSRI, 
included in Appendix C). The results in the tables are 
the coefficient estimates of the controls/independent 
variables on the dependent variable. Additionally, I 
tried to interact the SSRI and amnesty variables with 
the presence of peacekeeping variable (un2int) and 
did not find any significant relationships. The results 
of these tests are indicated in the tables under the IV/
Controls column (“Interactive term on UN Presence 
and [amnesty or SSRI]”).
Matching analysis
UN peacekeeping missions are not randomly 
assigned. UN peacekeeping and peace building mis-
sions intentionally go to the most difficult locations, 
the places where the intensity of conflict was high, and 
in the case of this study, where rule of law is poor or 
practically non-existent. Cases in which the UN inter-
venes for improving the rule of law are very different 
from cases in which the UN does not intervene. Thus, 
linear regressions may not effectively estimate the ef-
fect that UN peacekeeping has on the quality of rule of 
law in a post-conflict state, because a linear regression 
model can lead to effects that are more of a result of 
the model rather than the data itself.
I hope to resolve this selection issue by carrying 
out a matching analysis. This would involve choos-
ing two countries that are very similar on multiple 
dimensions. Then one mission would be “treated” 
with a UN mission, whereas the other one does not 
get the treatment. This sort of analysis is used by Gil-
ligan and Sergenti (2007), in which they determine 
whether or not UN interventions cause peace. Gilli-
gan and Sergenti, noticing that previous literature did 
not randomly assign UN missions in studying the re-
lationship between UN interventions and sustainable 
peace, correct for this flaw with matching techniques, 
using a sample of UN interventions in post-Cold War 
conflicts. They ultimately find, similar to the previous 
studies, that UN interventions are effective in sustain-
ing peace in post-conflict environments, but have no 
causal effect on peace while civil wars are still ongoing. 
By using non-random assignment of UN missions 
using matching techniques, they find that previous 
studies have underestimated the positive impact that 
UN interventions have on sustainable peace in a post-
conflict setting. The results suggest both that the UN 
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does have a strong ability to extend periods of peace 
and that the effect is larger than previously estimated 
by previous studies because of the correction for the 
nonrandom assignment of UN missions.23
Matching finds an overlap in cases of conflict 
that vary solely on whether or not UN peacekeeping 
was present. These cases are all matched based on a 
variety of controls. By finding the overlap between 
non-UN intervention and UN intervention cases 
based on the similarity of controls, matching allows 
for the comparison of similar cases. The controls used 
in this matching analysis are the log of deaths during 
conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and the duration of 
war. Matching thus assesses whether or not UN inter-
vention makes a difference in cases that had the same 
level of conflict. Matching helps give an average as-
sessment of the effect of peacekeeping on the quality 
of rule of law in a post-conflict state.
To start the matching analysis, I temporar-
ily coarsen exact match (CEM) the data by creating 
“bins.” The CEM command sorts the data into the var-
ious bins. The CEM command creates one “stratum” 
per observation of X, and then places each observa-
tion in a stratum. Then, the CEM command assigns 
each stratum to the original data and drops observa-
tions that do not contain at least one treated and one 
control unit. Then CEM creates a weight measure that 
I use in a regression with the uncoarsened data. The 
results of the “weighted” regression are the results of 
the matching analysis.24
REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
A. Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for 
World Bank measure
The empirical evidence does not support my 
theoretical hypotheses. There is not significant evi-
dence to show that UN peacekeeping (in any variation 
of mandate type) positively improves the rule of law 
quality in a post-conflict state.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping 
personnel in a post-conflict country will strength-
en the quality of the country’s rule of law institu-
tions
H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/
correlation between the presence of UN peace-
keeping personnel in a post-conflict country and 
the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions.
Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of 
UN mission mandate will increase its ability to 
strengthen the quality of a country’s rule of law 
institutions
H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship be-
tween the UN peacekeeping mission mandate and 
the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.
The regression tests conducted with the World 
Bank rule of law measure do not provide ample evi-
dence to support the original claim that UN peace-
keeping, or any increase in the mandate of UN peace-
keeping, is a causal mechanism for improving the 
quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. 
As seen each set of tests, the coefficients of the peace-
keeping variables (un2int, untype2, untype3, untype4, 
and untype5) are not statistically significant. Thus, I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. These results show 
that there is no clear relationship or association be-
tween UN peacekeeping and the quality of rule of law.
Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does 
not include provisions for security sector reform 
will lower the probability that a UN peacekeep-
ing mission can successfully strengthen the rule 
of law.
H0 (null): There is no significant relationship be-
tween the provision of security sector reform and 
the UN’s ability to strengthen the rule of law in a 
post-conflict setting.
The presence of security sector reform is not sig-
nificantly correlated with UN peacekeeping’s ability to 
improve the rule of law, thus I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Conversely, the lack of presence of secu-
rity sector reform in a negotiated settlement (as indi-
cated by 0 in the dummy variable) is not significantly 
correlated with a lower quality of rule of law. The coef-
ficient for this variable, while positive (indicating that 
the direction the hypothesis put forward is correct), 
is not statistically significant. The results show that 
there is no clear relationship or association between 
the presence of security sector reform, UN peacekeep-
ing, and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict 
environment.
Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures 
as a post-conflict justice mechanism will weaken 
UN peacekeeping’s ability to improve rule of law 
institutions in a post-conflict setting.
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H0 (null): There is no significant relationship 
between the presence of amnesty measures as a 
post-conflict justice mechanism and UN peace-
keeping’s ability to strengthen the quality of rule 
of law in a post-conflict setting. 
The presence of amnesty measures as a post-con-
flict justice mechanism is not significantly correlated 
with UN peacekeeping’s ability to improve the rule 
of law, and again I cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Amnesty measures, (controlling for several variables, 
including UN peacekeeping) however, are negatively 
correlated with the quality of rule of law in post-con-
flict states. Let us turn, for example, to Model A in the 
first set of tests that include the amnesty dummy vari-
able, in a post-conflict environment, controlling for all 
UN mandate types, the log of deaths during conflict, 
ethnic fractionalization, development, real GDP per 
capita, and the presence of a peace treaty. 
The results show for Model A that the presence 
of amnesty measures will cause a -0.123 unit change 
in the difference between rule of law quality ten years 
and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Given that 
the correlation coefficient of this regression is a nega-
tive number, the regression model results in a nega-
tive relationship between amnesty measures and the 
quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments 
after 1986. With twenty-two degrees of freedom in a 
two-tailed test, the 90-percent confidence interval of 
the slope will be -0.123 ± 0.06846(1.72) from -0.241 
to -0.005.
We can also examine Model C in the first set of 
tests that include the amnesty dummy variable, con-
trolling for UN peacekeeping missions with a man-
date to deploy of neutral military and/or civilian ob-
servers (untype 2), the log of deaths during conflict, 
ethnic fractionalization, development, real GDP per 
capita, and the presence of a peace treaty. The results 
for Model Cshow that the presence of amnesty mea-
sures will cause a -0.09863 unit change in the differ-
ence between rule of law quality ten years and eleven 
years after a conflict has ended. Just like the results 
from Model A detailed above, given the correlation 
coefficient of this regression is a negative number, this 
regression model results in a negative relationship 
between amnesty measures and the quality of rule of 
law in post-conflict environments after 1986. With 
twenty-five degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, 
the 90-percent confidence interval of the slope will be 
-0.09863 ± 0.0561(1.71) from -0.195 to -0.003.
 Given the correlation coefficients of the re-
gression equations for Models A and C for the am-
nesty variable are negative numbers, the multiple re-
gression models demonstrate a negative relationship 
between post-conflict amnesty measures and the rule 
of law. While it is not possible to conclude that post-
conflict amnesty measures distort/influence the UN’s 
ability to improve the rule of law (as Hypothesis 4 in-
tended to test), the data is consistent with the theoreti-
cal explanation that the presence of amnesty measures 
can result in an overall poorer quality of rule of law.
B. Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for 
CIM measure
The empirical evidence does not support the the-
oretical hypotheses. There is not ample enough evi-
dence to show that UN peacekeeping (in any variation 
of mandate type) is significant in positively improving 
the rule of law quality in a post-conflict state.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping 
personnel in a post-conflict country will strength-
en the quality of the country’s rule of law institu-
tions.
H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/
correlation between the presence of UN peace-
keeping personnel in a post-conflict country and 
the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions.
Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of 
UN mission mandate will increase its ability to 
strengthen the quality of a country’s rule of law 
institutions.
H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship be-
tween the UN peacekeeping mission mandate and 
the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.
The regression tests conducted with the CIM 
measure as the dependent variable do not provide 
ample evidence to support the original claim that UN 
peacekeeping, or any increase in the mandate of UN 
peacekeeping, is a causal mechanism for improving 
the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environ-
ment. As seen in each set of tests, the coefficients of 
the peacekeeping variables (un2int, untype2, untype3, 
untype4, and untype5) are not statistically significant. 
Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. These re-
sults show that there is no clear relationship or asso-
ciation between UN peacekeeping and the change in 
the quality of rule of law after a conflict has ended.
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Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does 
not include provisions for security sector reform 
will lower the probability that a UN peacekeep-
ing mission can successfully strengthen the rule 
of law.
H0 (null): There is no significant relationship be-
tween the provision of security sector reform and 
the UN’s ability to strengthen the rule of law in a 
post-conflict setting.
With the CIM proxy for the rule of law depen-
dent variable, the presence of security sector reform 
is not significantly correlated with the ability of UN 
peacekeeping to improve the rule of law. The coef-
ficient for this variable is not statistically significant. 
Thus, we cannot to reject the null hypothesis. The 
results show that there is no clear relationship or as-
sociation between the presence of security sector re-
form, UN peacekeeping, and the change in the quality 
of rule of law in a post-conflict environment.
Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures 
as a post-conflict justice mechanism (pcj.am-
nesty) will weaken UN peacekeeping’s ability to 
improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict 
setting.
H0 (null): There is no significant relationship 
between the presence of amnesty measures as a 
post-conflict justice mechanism and UN peace-
keeping’s ability to strengthen the quality of rule 
of law in a post-conflict setting. 
With the CIM proxy for the rule of law depen-
dent variable, the presence of amnesty as a post-con-
flict justice mechanism is not significantly correlated 
with UN peacekeeping’s ability to improve the rule of 
law; I cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Controls
While none of the hypotheses were accepted, this 
particular analysis shows that the log of deaths during 
a conflict has a negative correlation with the change in 
the quality of rule of law. In the first set of tests with 
Models A, B, and D, controlling for all UN mandate 
types, rGDP per capita, electricity consumption per 
capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, 
security sector reform, and war duration, the log of 
deaths per conflict is negatively correlated with the 
difference in CIM values ten years and eleven years 
after a conflict has ended. Additionally, in the second 
set of tests with Models A, B, C, D, E, and F, control-
ling for all mandate types, rGDP per capita, electric-
ity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, 
amnesty measures, and war duration, the log of deaths 
per conflict is also negatively correlated with the dif-
ference in CIM values ten years and eleven years after 
the conflict.
For example, the results in the first set of tests 
show that for Model A (in which all UN mission man-
date types are present), a one unit increase in the log 
number of deaths during conflict (logcost) will cause 
a -0.02451 unit change in the difference between CIM 
value ten years and eleven years after a conflict has 
ended. Given that the correlation coefficient of this 
regression is negative, the regression model results 
in a negative relationship between log of deaths dur-
ing conflict and the change in quality of rule of law 
in post-conflict environments after 1947. With thir-
ty-three degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 
90-percent confidence interval of the slope will be 
-0.02451 ± 0.01246(1.6924) from -0.0456 to -0.00342.
This particular analysis also shows that ethnic 
fractionalization has a positive correlation with the 
change in the quality of rule of law. In the first set of 
tests, Models A, B, C, D, E and F, controlling for all 
mandate types, rGDP per capita, electricity consump-
tion per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty mea-
sures, and war duration, ethnic fractionalization is 
positively correlated with the difference in CIM values 
ten years and eleven years after the conflict. Addition-
ally, in the second set of tests, Models A, B, C, D, E and 
F show a positive correlation between ethnic fraction-
alization and the difference in CIM values.
For example, the results in the first set of tests 
show that for Model A (in which all UN mission man-
date types are present), a one unit increase in the level 
of ethnic fractionalization will cause a 0.002193 unit 
change in the difference between CIM values ten years 
and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Given that 
the correlation coefficient of this regression is a posi-
tive number, the regression model results in a positive 
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the 
change in quality of rule of law in post-conflict envi-
ronments after 1947. With thirty-three degrees of free-
dom in a two-tailed test, the 95-percent confidence in-
terval of the slope will be 0.002193 ± 0.001012(1.6924) 
from 0.0005 to 0.0039.
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RESULTS FOR MATCHING ANALYSIS
A. Results for Matching Analysis using World Bank 
measure as dependent variable
I. Using CEM algorithm
Command used in STATA: 
cem wardur elf_destringed logcost, treatment(un2int)
Multivariate L1 distance: 0
Interpretation with algorithm CEM
Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping 
personnel in a post-conflict country will strength-
en the quality of the country’s rule of law institu-
tions 
H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/
correlation between the presence of UN peace-
keeping personnel in a post-conflict country and 
the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions.
The regression tests conducted with the World 
Bank difference measure as the dependent variable 
do not provide ample evidence to support the original 
claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for 
improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict 
environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis.
II. Using coarsened matching by explicit user choice
Command used in STATA: 
cem wardur (80) elf_destringed (25 65) logcost (10 12), 
treatment(un2int)
Multivariate L1 distance: .51111111
Interpretation with explicit user choice CEM
Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping 
personnel in a post-conflict country will strength-
en the quality of the country’s rule of law institu-
tions 
H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/
correlation between the presence of UN peace-
keeping personnel in a post-conflict country and 
the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions.
The regression tests conducted with the World 
Bank difference measure as the dependent variable 
do not provide ample evidence to support the original 
claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for 
improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict 






P-value Min. Max. 
un2int -.1495865 .1261033 0.301 -.4997054 .2005324 
Wardur .0007444 .0007952 0.402 -.0014633 .0029521 
Elf -.000358 .0021241 0.874 -.0062555 .0055395 
Logcost -.0782816 .0527691 0.212 -.2247922 .068229 
Constant 1.050172 .6103211 0.160   -.6443509 2.744695 






P-value Min. Max. 
un2int -.0618187 .0535736 0.260 -.172644 .0490067 
Wardur -.0000715 .000202 0.727 -.0004893 .0003463 
Elf -.0003919 .0008771 0.659 -.0022063 .0014226 
Logcost -.0066913 .0140664 0.639 -.0357899 .0224072 
Constant .1495394 .1915143 0.443 -.2466381 .5457169 

Table 4: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice)
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B. Results for Matching Analysis using CIM measure as 
dependent variable
I. Using CEM algorithm
Command used in STATA: 
cem wardur elf_destringed logcost, treatment(un2int)
Multivariate L1 distance: .18965517
Interpretation with algorithm CEM
Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping 
personnel in a post-conflict country will strength-
en the quality of the country’s rule of law institu-
tions 
H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/
correlation between the presence of UN peace-
keeping personnel in a post-conflict country and 
the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions.
The regression tests conducted with the CIM 
difference measure as the dependent variable do not 
provide ample evidence to support the original claim 
that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for im-
proving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict en-
vironment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.
II. Using coarsened matching by explicit user choice
Algorithm used in STATA: 
cem wardur (80) elf_destringed (25 65) logcost (10 12), 
treatment(un2int)
Multivariate L1 distance: .50222575
Interpretation with explicit user choice CEM
Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping 
personnel in a post-conflict country will strength-
en the quality of the country’s rule of law institu-
tions 
H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/
correlation between the presence of UN peace-
keeping personnel in a post-conflict country and 
the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions.
The regression tests conducted with the CIM 
difference measure as the dependent variable do not 
provide ample evidence to support the original claim 
that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for im-
proving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict en-
vironment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.
DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of the regression and matching tests 
were on the whole inconclusive in finding any specific 
directional relationship between peacekeeping and the 
rule of law in post-conflict state. The limitations of ex-
isting measures and data on the rule of law ultimately 
reduce the number of data points that can be analyzed 
in such a study. Given the limited data and quality of 
data on the rule of law there is a limited amount that 
can be said, using empirical large-N analysis as evi-
dence, on whether or not UN peacekeeping improves 
the rule of law. 
That being said, there is still much to be learned 
given the finding that peacekeeping had neither a 
significantly positive or negative effect on the rule of 
law in both the regression and matching analyses. For 




P-value Min. Max. 
un2int .001116 .0089213 0.901 -.0169951 .0192271 
wardur -.0000529 .0000782 0.503 -.0002116 .0001058 
elf -.0000333 .000155 0.831 -.000348 .0002815 
logcost .0021292 .0020669 0.310 -.0020668 .0063251 
constant -.0156197 .0228245 0.498 -.0619559 .0307166 

Table 5: Regression Results with algorithm CEM weight




P-value Min. Max. 
un2int .0155614 .0192143 0.420 -.022669 .0537918 
wardur .0000436 .000082 0.597 -.0001195 .0002066 
elf .0003126 .0003133 0.321 -.0003108 .0009361 
logcost -.004761 .0047257 0.317 -.0141636 .0046416 
constant .0280284 .0560619 0.618 -.0835172 .1395741 

Table 6: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice)
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both the World Bank Rule of Law measure and the 
Contract Intensive Money measure, there was no sig-
nificant relationship between UN peacekeeping in all 
iterations of the independent variable and hypotheses 
1 and 2, regardless of whether or not the rule of law 
improved after a conflict had ended. 
This has important implications for UN peace-
keeping rule of law activity. Even though UN peace-
keeping makes a concerted effort in promoting the 
rule of law in post-conflict states, its impact is un-
detectable in the long-term. The fact that UN peace-
keeping is not making an obvious improvement in the 
quality of rule of law in post-conflict states despite 
massive amounts of time and resources dedicated 
towards improving the rule of law means that there 
are most likely other factors/issues at hand (whether 
it be UN-based or host-country based) that impede 
the UN’s ability to decisively and comprehensively im-
prove the rule of law.
Another interesting conclusion that can be 
pulled from this analysis is the finding that amnesty 
measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism are 
negatively correlated with the difference in rule of law 
quality after a conflict has ended. While I was not able 
to find evidence that amnesty measures act as a con-
ditional/interactive factor between UN peacekeeping 
and the rule of law, there is much to be said about this 
finding about the relationship between amnesty mea-
sures and the rule of law. As discussed in the literature 
review, post-conflict amnesty measures can protect 
perpetrators of conflict and leave them politically and 
physically intact to launch into conflict again, thus 
harming efforts to improve the rule of law. This par-
ticular finding supports findings in the literature that 
amnesty measures can harm the durability of peace in 
a post-conflict setting.
CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH
Does UN peacekeeping improve the rule of law 
in a post-conflict society? I proposed that UN peace-
keeping helps improve the long-term rule of law by 
both physically improving the rule of law institutions 
themselves and building up public confidence in vari-
ous rule of law institutions (such as the police and 
justice sectors). The empirical results, however, do not 
provide ample enough evidence to confirm that UN 
peacekeeping improves or harms the rule of law after 
the end of a conflict. It does not appear that UN peace-
keeping has a substantive effect on improving rule of 
law institutions in the long-term. While the findings 
are inconclusive regarding the relationship between 
UN peacekeeping and the rule of law in post-conflict 
settings in the long-term, they still have important ap-
plications for the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. 
Even though UN peacekeeping spends significant ef-
fort and time rebuilding the rule of law in post-con-
flict states, their impact is difficult to determine.
Although the empirical results do not provide 
significant evidence for the research question, there is 
evidence that amnesty measures as a post-conflict jus-
tice mechanism can harm the quality of rule of law in 
a post-conflict state. This particular finding serves as 
support for the findings of Lie, Binningsbø, and Gates, 
who find that amnesty measures negatively affect the 
overall durability of peace in a post-conflict environ-
ment. It also has implications for policy makers decid-
ing what post-conflict justice mechanisms will most 
benefit a society in the short-term and long-term: 
Amnesty measures could convince armed groups to 
put down their arms in the immediate end of a con-
flict, but may have negative implications for the qual-
ity of rule of law in the post-conflict environment.
The “non-findings” of this empirical analysis 
complement the findings of the qualitative studies 
carried out by the Stimson Center that evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of UN peacekeeping in reforming and sup-
porting the rule of law. UN peacekeeping theoretically 
has the capability and necessary mandate to improve 
the rule of law in a post-conflict state, but it is difficult 
for them to make a decisive positive impact because of 
several practical realities. The physical environments 
in which missions deploy most obviously pose diffi-
cult challenges to logistics, but also to the efficient use 
of resources. Resources may be poured into a mission’s 
efforts to improve the rule of law, but if the mission’s 
tasks are not finely tuned to the regional and domestic 
challenges and frameworks that guide society, those 
resources could end up going to waste. Ultimately, this 
could reduce the positive impact UN peacekeeping on 
the rule of law.
The main policy implication of this study is that 
smarter peacekeeping operations are needed, not just 
an increase in resources or stronger mandates. It is 
clear that throwing any amount of resources at a prob-
lem will not automatically rebuild the rule of law. Us-
ing resources effectively is crucial to long-term success 
in rebuilding and restoring the rule of law. One such 
way in which UN peacekeeping missions can improve 
their effectiveness in reforming the rule of law is by 
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effectively using donor funds to reach both short-
term and long-term goals. UN peacekeeping missions 
should continue to focus on short-term goals, but 
they should also organize partnerships to help reach 
longer-term goals. There needs to be a strategic plan 
if any of the UN’s quick impact projects on improv-
ing the rule of law are to actually make a difference 
in substantively improving the rule of law. Short-term 
achievements are inherently undermined by the fact 
that progress is needed in longer-term goals for the 
short-term achievements to mean anything in long run.
Secondly, right now the UN is focusing on the 
individual capacity of rule of law officials—police, 
corrections officers, and justice sector personnel like 
judges and lawyers—and the institutional capacity of 
rule of law institutions. More focus should be placed 
on institutional integrity if the mechanisms proposed 
in the theoretical portion of this paper are to actually 
work. Simply put, focusing on improving the institu-
tional integrity and reliability of rule of law institu-
tions will alleviate distrust of these institutions and 
lead to their more frequent use by the public. Mean-
while, UN peacekeeping components should consider 
a policy approach to customary justice mechanisms 
at the start of a mission as a crucial element that can 
promote accessibility to justice.
Thirdly, it is also important that UN peacekeep-
ing work on improving coordination between police, 
justice, and corrections sectors of rule of law institu-
tions. It is clear that one sector affects the other, and 
one challenge that a sector faces will ultimately influ-
ence how effective another sector is in carrying out 
its essential functions. By improving information 
sharing, each sector could potentially improve coor-
dination of activities and prevent issues such as over-
crowding of prisons or overloading of court dockets.
There is much room for future research on the 
relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule 
of law. As mentioned in the discussion, a major limita-
tion of this study was the relatively small sample size. 
Future research on this topic should obtain more data 
for analysis by, for example, looking at lower levels of 
conflict. This would entail extending the data set from 
only civil wars to include cases of internal strife that 
maintained a lower level of hostility than a civil war. 
Another way in which future research could expand 
upon this study is by exploring alternative measures of 
the dependent variable of rule of law. A major limita-
tion of the World Bank measure was its time frame. It 
only started releasing the rule of law scores starting in 
1996. This time frame limited the number of cases I 
could use from the original Doyle and Sambanis data set. 
While the CIM measure, calculated from IMF 
data, had a much larger time frame than the World 
Bank data (I was able to get data dating back to 1946), 
the CIM measure does have downfalls as a proxy for 
the rule of law. The creators of the CIM value describe 
CIM as a measure of the enforceability of contracts 
and the security of property rights. Although property 
rights and the enforceability of contracts are impor-
tant aspects of the rule of law, they do not completely 
align with the definition of rule of law presented at 
the start of this paper. Importantly, CIM functions 
as a measure that combines both legal institutional 
and non-legal institutional factors. It can be difficult 
to tell whether or not societies with high CIM values 
have faith in legal methods that enable more business 
transactions or if they have faith in legal methods that 
hold all persons, institutions and entities, including 
the government itself, accountable to laws that are 
equitably enforced and consistent with international 
human rights norms. Thus a future avenue of research 
on this relationship would have to look into finding a 
measure of the rule of law that has a larger time frame 
for conflicts, in addition to content validity. This 
means that the data should have a higher degree of 
correspondence with the concept of rule of law and 
the measurement technique should include all aspects 
of the rule of law, as defined by the researcher.
Even though there is uncertainty in the results 
of the empirical findings, the end result of UN peace-
keeping not having any obvious effect on the rule of 
law in a post-conflict setting is disconcerting. There 
is an expectation in the international community that 
UN peacekeeping, given all the time and resources it 
employs, has at least some positive effect on the rule of 
law. Ultimately, there is no detectable positive impact 
is a cause for concern. More importantly, it provides 
grounds for the UN and international peacebuilding 
community to evaluate how UN peacekeeping mis-
sions can better effectively utilize resources to rebuild 
the rule of law and make sure that post-conflict soci-
eties are safe and secure. The rule of law is necessary 
for the stability of societies, especially those emerging 
from conflict. Thus it will be a challenge not just for 
UN peacekeepers, but also for the peacebuilding com-
munity, to focus not just on the short-term capacity 
needs, but also on building effective institutions that 
can prevent infractions and breakdowns of the rule of 
law that lead to conflict in the first place.
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APPENDIX
Description of Matching Methodology
With Coarsened Exact Matching, there are two ways to coarsen the data. One way is to run the automatic 
binning algorithm, while the other way involves self-defining cut points and bins for each control. The auto-
matic binning results in more bins, but fewer bins will actually have matched cases. Using fewer cases allows for 
a better comparison of exact matches, as there are fewer cases. Thus, using the automatic algorithm provides 
matching analysis with better internal validity. Using pre-determined cut points allows for more observations 
to have matches and for a larger set of cases to be analyzed in a weighted regression. Using the pre-determined 
cut points, however, can result in more coarsening of the data, and involve more cases in the weighted regres-
sion analysis that are not an exact match. Thus, using the pre-determined cut points method will result in a 
higher external validity, but lower internal validity of the weighted regression. In this study, I run the matching 
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Results from regression with difference in World Bank rule of law scores
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
Standard errors are in parentheses Significant results are colored yellow
Table 7: PCJ Amnesty
IV/Controls Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F

















































































































































(1.285e-01) NA NA NA NA
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Table 8: SSRI
IV/Controls Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F















































































































































(1.999e-01) NA NA NA NA
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Table 9: No PCJ Amnesty or SSRI
IV/Controls Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F
logcost
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Results from regression with difference in CIM VALUES
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1
Standard errors are in parentheses Significant results are colored yellow
Table 10: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time)
IV/Controls Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F


































































































































(7.621e-02) NA NA NA


















(1.858e-01) NA NA NA NA
-1.706e-02
(1.667e-01)
Interactive term on 




(1.107e-01) NA NA NA NA
Interactive term on 
UN presence and 
SSR (un2int*SSRI) NA
3.408e-02
(1.771e-01) NA NA NA NA
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Table 11: Controls + Amnesty control (no SSRI)
 
IV/Controls Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F



















































































































(5.512e-02) NA NA NA


















(1.478e-01) NA NA NA NA
7.336e-03
(1.424e-01)
Interactive term on 




(8.376e-02) NA NA NA NA
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Table 12: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty)
IV/Controls Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F



















































































































(4.281e-02) NA NA NA


















(1.398e-01) NA NA NA NA
1.774e-02
(1.315e-01)
Interactive term on 




(8.270e-02) NA NA NA NA
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Table 13: Controls sans Amnesty and SSR controls
IV/Controls Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F




































































































(3.374e-02) NA NA NA
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Summary Statistics for World Bank Rule of Law dataset
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum N
develop 691.2512 1076.5450407 14.000000 5387.00000 65
difference.wbgi.rle 0.02015772 0.1538614 -0.454220 0.4546193 43
elf 51.20690 29.9764578 0 93.00000 58
logcost 12.46568 2.2113066 6.907755 15.6718100 65
pcj.amnesty 0.3846154 0.4902903 0 1 65
rgdpcaps 1624.0 1408.5310353 130.000000 5827.00000 63
SSRI 0.1666667 0.3761774 0 1 54
treaty 0.4153846 0.4966232 0 1 65
un2int 0.5230769 0.5033541 0 1 65
untype2 0.1846154 0.3910046 0 1 65
untype3 0.07692308 0.2685431 0 1 65
untype4 0.1076923 0.3124038 0 1 65
untype5 0.03076923 0.1740358 0 1 65
wardur 107.8154 108.4184446 1 600.00000 65




CIM.difference.11.10 -0.01169318 0.09989931 -0.8950195 .09367647 94
develop 549.41978529 863.4991 10 5387.000 119
elf 47.79464286 30.45633 0 93.0000 112
logcost 12.04126899 2.357759 6.9077550 15.67181 118
pcj.amnesty 0.37179487 0.4864121 0 1 119
rgdpcaps 1424.68141593 1321.930 65 5832.000 78
SSRI 0.11764706 0.3237808 0 1 113
treaty 0.29411765 0.4575717 0 1 102
un2int 0.36974790 0.4847775 0 1 119
untype2 0.14285714 0.3514067 0 1 119
untype3 0.06722689 0.2514734 0 1 119
untype4 0.05882353 0.2362890 0 1 119
untype5 0.02521008 0.1574255 0 1 119
wardur 81.00840336 94.08322 1 600.0000 119
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